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eleonore Stump claims in her book Wandering in Darkness that the 
problem of evil – better: ‘the problem of suffering’ – can be solved best 
by the help of narratives (p. xviii). Narratives are according to her view 
very important for solving this problem, because they allow one to get 
a more general view about relevant parts of the discussion of suffering. 
In this context she distinguishes the more detailed view of the discussion 
from a more general one by two different modes of cognition: the mode 
of gathering Dominican knowledge that and the mode of gathering 
Franciscan knowledge how. Stump thinks that this distinction is crucial 
for a solution to the problem of suffering:
If we can learn from the narratives the Franciscan knowledge [how], we 
can then use that knowledge in the (Dominican) philosophical project 
of formulating a defense and spelling out the nature of a possible morally 
sufficient reason for God to allow human suffering. (p. 61)
I’m doubting this thesis and will try to argue against it by unfolding 
a distinction of knowledge that and knowledge how in the sense of Stump 
(i), summarizing her solution (ii) and showing that within this solution 
the distinction is not essential (iii).
I. DomINICuS VS. FrANCIS
The distinction of knowing that and knowing how in contemporary 
epistemology traces back to Gilbert ryle (ryle 1971). one can 
distinguish roughly knowing that from knowing how by a  distinction 
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of the domains of the operations: the first is knowledge of propositions 
whereas the second is knowledge of something other than propositions. 
So, e.g., we usually distinguish the mode of knowing that Hannah rides 
a bicycle, i.e. knowing the proposition ‘Hannah rides a bicycle.’, from the 
mode of knowing how it is to ride a bicycle. Note that sometimes also 
such a distinction is made by distinguishing along the line of bertrand 
russell’s proposal to differentiate between knowledge by description 
and knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., endnote 24, pp. 498f and p. 61: 
‘Knowledge by acquaintance as philosophers have discussed it is thus 
just one species of knowledge in the Franciscan mode.’). Note also that 
our distinction according to the domains of the operations is in fact very 
rough and is convincingly criticised, e.g., in (Fumerton 2008: sect. 1, 
par. 6–8). but for the purpose of our argumentation our coarse-grained 
distinction seems to be subtle enough.
It is natural to ask which relations hold between these two modes. 
ryle for himself thinks that there is no relevant relation between them. 
He thinks especially that there is no – as, e.g., stipulated by the so-called 
intellectualist legend (‘knowing-that is taken as the ideal model of all 
operations of intelligence’, (see ryle 1971: 215)) – relation of reduction 
between knowing that and knowing how. ryle argues for this claim by 
trying to show that if knowing how could be reduced to knowing that, 
then knowledge about how things are wouldn’t manifest ever and 
so there wouldn’t exist any knowing how at all (for a  short summary 
of ryle’s argumentation see Stanley & Williamson 2001: 413). Contrary 
to ryle’s  point of view there are two alternatives. one can claim in 
accordance with the intellectualist legend that knowing how is reducible 
to knowing that as, e.g., Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson do. 
According to them the truth conditions for a  sentence like ‘Hannah 
knows how to ride a bicycle.’ are expressible exactly by the truth condition 
of the sentence ‘For some contextually relevant way w for Hannah to ride 
a bicycle, Hannah knows that w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle.’. 
but one can also claim that the reduction goes the other way round by 
arguing for the thesis that knowing that is fully reducible to knowing how. 
Such a position is, e.g., expressed by Stephen Hetherington and is argued 
for by the claim that knowing that is commonly characterized as justified 
true belief and that in being justified in a proposition, one also knows 
how to apply correctly the reasons for believing in that proposition 
(Hetherington 2008: 316). Also along this line of argumentation, Hilary 
Putnam claims that ‘knowing the meaning of the word “gold” or of the 
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word “elm” is not a matter of knowing that at all, but a matter of knowing 
how [to find experts]’ (Putnam 1996: xvi).
Stump agrees with the position of ryle, although she uses another 
line of argumentation. She thinks that the main difference between both 
modes of cognition lies in a different point of view. Whereas the mode 
of knowing that is much more detail oriented, technical, and by this 
sometimes narrow and restricted, the mode of knowing how is much more 
general and by this broad (see pp. 23, 27, 62). For distinguishing these 
modes she gives a  prototypic and eponymous example: A  Dominican 
wanted Francis to explain God’s claim that if he (the Dominican) doesn’t 
warn the wicked man about his wickedness, God will hold him (the 
Dominican) responsible for the wicked man’s sins. The Dominican’s 
interpretation of this claim was very straightforward and so he thought 
that he will be held responsible for many sins of many wicked men he 
hadn’t instructed. In opposition to the narrow view of the Dominican, 
Francis’ answer was much more generalizing. He proposed to interpret 
this claim as: ‘a servant of God should be burning with life and holiness 
so brightly that by the light of example and the tongue of his conduct, 
he will rebuke all the wicked. In that way [... he] will proclaim their 
wickedness to all of them.’ The example ends ‘with the Dominican’s going 
away very impressed’ (pp. 44f). our identification of the Franciscan 
mode of knowledge with knowledge how can be justified in the following 
way: the classical phenomena of knowing how as, e.g., ‘knowledge of 
redness’, ‘knowing a colour’ and more generally knowledge of ‘various 
other first-person experiences’ are according to Stump not reducible to 
knowledge that (cf. pp. 50f). Since she stipulates: ‘I will call knowledge 
which cannot be reduced to knowledge that “Franciscan knowledge”; 
I will call the other, more philosophically ordinary kind of knowledge 
“Dominican knowledge”’ (p. 51), the classical phenomena of knowing 
how is Franciscan knowledge.
According to this identification and the example about the Dominican 
and the Franciscan above, one can distinguish the Dominican mode of 
knowing that from the Franciscan mode of knowing how by distinguishing 
the way of interpreting a  text. To adhere to the general distinction of 
knowing that from knowing how by a distinction of the domain of these 
operations, one may say that Francis’ knowledge seems to be not about 
a single proposition, but about a whole text in some context, or yet more 
abstract about something intended by God, etc. The relevant part of 
this distinction is the fact that in the Dominican mode there was only 
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one interpretation of the expression ‘proclaim to the wicked man his 
wickedness’, whereas in the Franciscan mode there were several such 
interpretations under consideration. Stump thinks that the Franciscan 
mode of knowing something – e.g., knowing how to warn the wicked 
man about his wickedness – is sometimes more adequate than the 
Dominican mode of knowing something – e.g., knowing that the wicked 
man has to be warned (whereby ‘warned’ is understood literally) about 
his wickedness – because the Franciscan mode is sometimes more 
appropriate than the Dominican mode by the fact that it is vague:
[...] in cases where necessary and sufficient conditions for something are 
hard to find or in the nature of things not available (for example, because 
what we are attempting to define is irreducibly vague), then Franciscan 
categorization or typology may in fact be more accurate, or at least 
more true to the phenomena, than Dominican categorization, which 
misrepresents the thing it seeks to describe. (Stump 2010: 47)
This fact can be illustrated in a simplified way by mapping the expression 
‘proclaim to the wicked man his wickedness’ Dominicanly to the order 
Tell the wicked man that he is wicked! and Franciscanly to the, e.g., three 
orders Tell the wicked man that he is wicked!, Burn with life and holiness 
so brightly that by the light of example and the tongue of conduct you 
rebuke all the wicked! (p. 44) and, e.g., Show the wicked man that he 
is wicked by your exemplary life and awake the desire in him to change 
his wicked life! which is to state that ‘proclaim to the wicked man his 
wickedness’ is vague (note that by an illustration with such a mapping 
vagueness is understood in the sense of an ‘ambiguity on a grand and 
systematic scale’ (Fine 1975: 282)). under the assumption that someone 
who burns with life and holiness very brightly and who does not tell 
the wicked man that he is wicked is nevertheless not responsible for the 
wicked man’s sins, the Dominican interpretation is false or inaccurate 
whereas the Franciscan interpretation is more accurate inasmuch as it is 
true in two out of three cases.
This distinction of knowing that and knowing how is not complete, 
because there seem to be some other relevant forms of knowing how than 
those acquired by (vague) re-interpretation. Stump says that she is ‘not 
able to say what all these cases [of irreducible Franciscan knowledge] 
have in common’ (p. 47). but since the third part of her book is a  re-
interpretation of biblical stories, this distinction of knowing that and 
159KNoWleDGe bY NArrATIVeS 
knowing how or knowing by narratives seem to be one of the most relevant 
ones for Stump’s defence.
Sometimes, as, e.g., in Stump’s argumentation, it is also useful or 
necessary to speak about the fact that someone knows some person. 
Since persons are not propositions, this mode of knowing is – according 
to the given basic criterion for a distinction – also a mode of knowing 
how and by this Franciscan knowledge. So, in Stump’s view, also for 
this mode of knowledge holds what was said above: to know a person 
is not reducible to knowing some propositions about this person. more 
precisely speaking, the claim that Hannah knows Paula, e.g., cannot be 
reduced to some claim of the sort: Hannah knows that Paula has black 
hair, that she is a student, that she is in love with Jerome, etc. To give 
such an interpretation of ‘Hannah knows Paula.’ would be too narrow 
and would be thinking in the Dominican mode. Also knowing other 
things like countries – e.g., knowing China – is not reducible to a set of 
claims about the countries (cf. Stump 2010: 373f), which, again, would 
be knowledge in the Dominican mode. According to Stump there is 
something missing in that mode, and that there is something missing 
is not due to the fact that in the Dominican mode a list of propositions 
about Paula or China will always be incomplete. The difference appears 
according to her because, e.g., knowing a person includes also having 
some second-person and not only a third-person experience with that 
person (cf. p. 56). So, in order to understand that someone knows 
a  person it is necessary to get second-person experience with that 
person. And here the role of narratives come into play. According to 
Stump, second person experience ‘can be made available to others who 
lack the second-person experiences in question by means of a story that 
represents the experience’ (p. 81).
What is true of cognition is, in Stump’s view, also true of desires and 
wishes and so one can also distinguish two different optative modes, 
a Dominican mode of desiring that and a Franciscan mode of desiring 
how, e.g., desiring a  person (cf. p. 57). The cognitive and the optative 
mode are according to her fully available only in the Franciscan mode 
and so an adequate understanding of a person’s knowing how and desiring 
how is possible not by arguments (alone), but by a consideration of stories.
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II. STumP’S reCoNSTruCTIoN oF THe AQuINeAN DeFeNCe
Stump aims with her book to give a solution to the problem of suffering 
by providing a  framework for designing a  possible world wherein for 
every suffering of a mentally fully functional adult human being there 
is a  morally sufficient reason for God to allow this suffering which is 
to allow the undermining of a  person’s flourishing or to allow the 
depriving of her desires of the heart (cf. pp. 4, 8). The possible world she 
characterizes is the one designed by Thomas Aquinas.
Preliminary to the defence is Aquinas’ theory of love, which will be 
sketched first: there are, according to Aquinas, two necessary conditions 
for some x in order for that x to be in love with some y (cf. p. 91):
 – x desires the (objectively) good for y, and
 – x desires union with y
Furthermore, there are two necessary conditions for x’s being in union 
with y, namely personal presence and mutual closeness (cf. p. 109). And 
there are again two necessary conditions for y’s being personally present 
to x, namely: x has second-person experience with y, and x and y have 
shared attention, where shared attention is the common triadic relation 
(of triangulation): x and y join attention (‘are meeting in minds’) with 
respect to some entity z  (cf. pp. 112f). Stump also gives a  necessary 
condition for mutual closeness between x and y: ‘A  person alienated 
from himself cannot have someone else close to him.’ (p.  125) So, 
a necessary condition for being in mutual closeness with someone is to 
be personally integrated. Personal integration is defined in an expanded 
Frankfurtean sense: the desires of a  person x can be distinguished 
according to the  iteration of the operation of desiring within the 
desires. let’s call the operation of desiring ‘Dx’. Then, e.g., x’s desiring of 
a proposition p, i.e. Dxp, is a first-order desire, whereas, e.g., x’s desiring 
of desiring p, i.e. DxDxp, is a second-order desire (cf. p. 138). According 
to Stump, a person x lacks personal integration iff at least one of the 
following two conditions is satisfied (cf. p. 139):
 – there is some p such that x desires p and x desires ~p on the same 
level, i.e. e.g., Dxp&Dx~p, or
 – there is some p such that p is objectively wrong and x desires p, i.e. 
Dxp where p is objectively wrong
Aquinas, so Stump, thinks that an anthropic property of a human’s web of 
desire is that every person has a will ‘which is strong enough to enable him 
to form the first-order volition to ask God to strengthen his will’ (p. 159), 
161KNoWleDGe bY NArrATIVeS 
so it holds for every person x that it’s possible for her to generate DxDxp, 
where p represents ‘God helps x’.
With this preliminary claims about love at hand, we can now sketch 
the Aquinean theory of functional suffering, i.e. Stump’s defence! 
According to the given theory of love, a person x loves God only in case 
that x desires the objectively good for God (which is according to Stump, 
since God does not lack any good, to desire what God desires as good – 
cf. p. 101) and x desires union with God. by the definitions given above, 
union with God can be thought of as ‘meeting in mind’ with God in 
a situation of triangulation. For being able to get united with God in such 
a situation, it is, as sketched above, necessary to be personally integrated. 
And exactly here, so Stump says, the morally sufficient reason of God’s 
allowing suffering has to be sought: since union is a necessary condition 
for loving God and since personal integration is a necessary condition for 
union, God may allow suffering in order to support personal integration 
(some scientific investigations show that sometimes a person’s suffering 
can enable her to grow in psychic integration, e.g., in the situation of 
posttraumatic growth – cf. p. 458). Since personal integration is of so 
much importance in loving God, it’s natural to give the following scale 
of values (cf. p. 387):
(-) fragmentation < partly fragmentation < ... < partly integration 
< full integration/glory (+)
on Aquinas’ view, it is fair (morally sufficiently reasonable) only to allow 
suffering in one of the following two situations:
 – Case m1: suffering involuntarily simpliciter 
suffering1 is necessary to avoid suffering2 whereby 
|suffering1| < |suffering2|
 – Case m2: suffering secundum quid (without giving up one’s heart 
desires – cf. p. 383) 
suffering1 is necessary to achieve benefit1 whereby 
|suffering1| < |benefit1|
Since absolute fragmentation (the worst thing, i.e. hell – cf. p. 404) is 
very negative, according to m1 it is morally sufficiently reasonable for 
God to allow suffering to some extent for the avoidance of absolute 
fragmentation. And since full personal integration or glory is very 
positive (cf. p. 404), according to m2 it is morally sufficiently reasonable 
for God to allow – of course only in full accordance with the ‘real desires’ 
of the sufferer – suffering for glorification in such model situations to 
some extent also.
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This is a  very brief sketch of the general framework wherein 
discussions of the problem of suffering should be embedded according 
to Aquinas and Stump. In the next section we are going to indicate how 
Stump embeds in this framework the discussion of the suffering of Job, 
Samson, Abraham and mary of bethany. We will then try to show that 
the result of her embedding is an understanding of that suffering in the 
Dominican mode.
III. A mArrIAGe oF THe TWo APProACHeS
Stump has established the methodology of her investigation in the first 
part of the book. In the second part she established Aquinas’ theory of love. 
In the third part she considered some biblical stories on the suffering of 
the four biblical characters Job, Samson, Abraham and mary of bethany. 
And in the final part she established her defence. According to her own 
evaluation, the first two parts are in the Dominican mode, the third part 
is in the Franciscan mode and in the fourth part she tries ‘to marry the 
two approaches’ (p. 63). my aim here is to show that the marriage is very 
one-sided and that it is Dominic who is on the mighty side.
The problem of suffering in the discussion of the biblical stories of 
the four mentioned characters may be described as follows: Job is a good 
man, cares about his family, is responsible with his holdings, and praises 
God. Nevertheless God allows that misery comes upon him. So we 
naturally ask why God allows this and what the morally sufficient reason 
for letting Job suffer could be. At first glance, i.e. from a  Dominican 
perspective, we are not able to find such a reason because the ‘real desires’ 
of Job are not visible to us. We don’t know, e.g., whether DJobp – where 
p represents ‘Job has the most extensive and powerful conversation with 
God.’ – or not. but by taking a Franciscan perspective, i.e. by widening 
the ways of interpreting the story, we may come to an affirmative answer 
to the question. And by applying model m2 (suffering in order to achieve 
a great benefit), we may be satisfied in finding a morally sufficient reason 
for God’s allowing the suffering of Job.
In a similar way one may posit a problem with the stories of Samson, 
Abraham, and mary, then reconsider their stories, after that apply the 
models of functional suffering, and finally end up with the following 
results (cf. pp. 401f):
 – Sanctification (m2): ‘Job begins by losing all that apparently 
constitutes flourishing in his society. but at the end of his story 
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God comes to talk to him face to face in the most extensive and 
powerful conversation.’
 – Sanctification (m2): ‘Abraham [...] has struggled his way to a deep 
trust in God that makes him a father of faith.’
 – Sanctification (m2): ‘mary is heartbroken when her beloved 
brother dies [...] but at the end of her story she has come closer 
to Jesus than even the apostle on whom Jesus founds his church 
[which is indicated by the feet washing scene].’
 – Justification (m1): ‘Samson’s [...] suffering is justified in virtue of its 
contribution to warding off for Samson the worst thing for human 
beings.’
 – Sanctification (m2): ‘because Samson reacts passionately [...], his 
suffering also contributes to making him glorious.’
As one can clearly see, for embedding the discussions of the various 
sufferings one always has to switch into the Dominican mode. only 
a  clear (non-vague) understanding of the desires of the different 
persons (DAbrahamp, where p represents ‘Abraham is the father of faith.’, 
etc.) allows one to find a  morally sufficient reason for each suffering. 
Think on the example of proclaiming the wicked man his wickedness! 
by Franciscan knowledge one may get several possible interpretations 
of some expressions. but for understanding what to do, one has to 
make a decision for a  specific interpretation. Something similar holds 
also for the defence: in order to embed discussions of suffering into 
the framework provided by Aquinas and Stump, one also has to make 
a decision for a specific interpretation. It seems to me obvious that the 
application of the defence (which is to embed the discussion into 
the provided framework) starts from a clear and non-vague description 
of the problematic situation under consideration. Similar observations 
can be made in general in discussions where one uses narratives or 
a parable for illustrating relations of analogy: in such a discussion people 
usually ask for a  more detailed description until they end up with an 
exact non-vague description of the similarities. And that is to end up 
with knowledge in a Dominican and not a Franciscan mode.
The only part where Franciscan empathy seems to be of relevance 
with respect to the provided defence is not in the application of 
Aquinas’ and Stump’s general framework to the single stories, but in 
a reconsideration and preparation of the stories. Although the, by Stump 
re-told, stories of Job, Samson, Abraham and mary of bethany may be 
accepted as adequate reformulations by many philosophers of religion, 
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etc., an argumentation for the adequacy of such reformulations and 
preparations seems to be very incomplete, prone to problems and by 
this excluded from an elaborated defence. So, regarding the acquirement 
of knowledge or beliefs, both modes may be adequate, but regarding 
justification of  one’s beliefs, only the Dominican mode seems to be 
adequate (cf. for this claim also the usual distinction of methods in the 
philosophy of science between methods within the context of discovery 
and methods within the context of justification). let me make this point 
more clear by summing up the argumentation:
(1) one may distinguish, as Stump does, two modes of knowledge, 
namely Dominican and Franciscan knowledge.
(2) Dominican knowledge is characterized as propositional know-
ledge (knowing that). Franciscan knowledge is characterized as 
non-propositional knowledge (knowing how).
(3) one – for the defence very relevant – kind of non-propositional 
knowledge is knowledge by narratives, that is, e.g., not only 
having in mind a  very detailed description of the situation of 
Job’s suffering, but taking also a  more general and vague point 
of view about his suffering (which can be expressed technically as 
ambiguous mapping of descriptions to situations, facts or orders).
(4) The defence of Aquinas and Stump is applicable only in case 
of a  non-vague or non-ambiguous description of a  situation of 
suffering.
(5) Hence, the defence is applicable only in the Dominican mode.
because of this reason I think that the ‘convincing power’ of Franciscan 
story telling may be doubted.
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